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1. INTRODUCTION
"Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands.
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed."1
The scope and extent of the right of privacy, as a recognized legal right, is
still shrouded in part by a veil of ignorance. At one point there may have been
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3, lines 160-66, in THE NORTON
SHAKESPEARE 2135 (Stephen Greenblatt et al. eds., 1997).
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a "cultural understanding that life contained public and private spheres and that
even celebrities and powerful public officials deserved some semblance of
private lives."2 However, that understanding has yielded to societal and market-
oriented demands for personal information and use of celebrity images.' Stories
about celebrities' and, most recently, ordinary people's private lives have
increased in quantity, intensity, and degree of intrusion over the last decade.4
As evidenced by the growth in what is now referred to as "reality television,"
which includes programs such as Big Brother, Survivor and Jerry Springer, the
public has become intrigued with viewing what goes on behind closed doors.
In addition, privacy rights have gained increasing exposure because of
technological innovation and the unprecedented ability to intrude and
appropriate a person's identity, image, and private space without consent
through the use of advanced technological equipment.5 As more information
about us is easily attainable by the public, "societal concerns over personal
privacy inevitably intensify. ''6 "[T]he modem media have become more
aggressive in gathering potentially embarrassing information about private
individuals."7 However, "public demand for personal information is
unrelenting."' These concerns and intrusive practices have led lawmakers to
propose higher accountability for the invasion of an individual's privacy
interest. 9
As a result, all branches of government have begun to focus attention on
expanding and protecting an individual's right to privacy.10 A trend has
emerged, which signals an increasingly expansive view of the right of privacy
by the courts, in particular with respect to the right of publicity.
2. Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1999).
3. Anita L. Allen, Privacy and the Public Official: Talking About Sex as a Dilemma for
Democracy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165,1165 (1999) (citing Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 728-30 (1999)).
4. Smolla, supra note 2, at 1098.
5. Id. ("What was once the high-tech exotica of spy movies is now readily available to the
upscale mail-order customer: cameras that can fit within a pair of eyeglasses, microphones that
hear through walls from afar to pick up the sighs and whispers of the bedroom, and telephone
taps that can make anyone a fully-equipped Linda Tripp.").
6. C. Thomas Dienes, Protecting Investigative Journalism, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1139,
1139 (1999).
7. Robert M. O'Neill, Privacy and Press Freedom: Paparazzi and Other Intruders, 1999
U. ILL. L. REV. 703, 703.
8. Allen, supra note 3, at 1165.
9. O'Neill, supra note 7, at 703.
10. Approximately twenty states recognize the right of publicity. Michael Madow, Private
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 132
(1993) (citing THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6.1 [B] (1992)).
See also ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHALL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 547 (1996)
(determining that over half of the states have recognized publicity rights by statute or common
law).
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Although, as will be seen throughout this Article, Congress and state
legislatures have begun to develop statutory guidelines, the major area of
expansion comes as a result of a "judicially activist" understanding of the right
of privacy. Stare decisis, that "hobgoblin of little minds,"'" even though often
times adhered to rigidly, will on other occasions-if "justice" demands-be
disregarded completely. The almost complete unpredictability of the courts in
certain areas regarding the right of privacy, in particular the right of publicity,
has been much to the chagrin of legal scholars and commentators.
The trend in the Ninth Circuit12 may tempt courts to widen the scope of the
right of publicity to an extent that might impinge on core values protected by
free expression. Similarly, state legislatures are beginning to expand protection
of privacy and publicity rights.
The purpose of this Article is to explore the extent of an individual's right
of privacy vis-A-vis the concepts of commercial use and appropriations, which
compromise rights of publicity. The deceptively simple, yet complex,
conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that a delicate balance of interests
must be struck, either legislatively or judicially, between recognizing a full
right of privacy and its permutations in the right of publicity with press and
news media. A definitive balancing test may be elusive, but at a minimum, a
framework for principled decision making must be attempted.
However, before plunging into this quagmire, it is vitally important that the
desiderata of the right of privacy be considered in its complete historical and
legal context. The countervailing influence of the Federal Constitution as well
as this relatively new right of publicity must also be considered in relation to
this basic privacy right. Included in the analysis will be the recent movement
on the part of state governments, specifically California and Indiana, to protect
individuals from the excessive intrusiveness of the media and the commercial
appropriation of images while still balancing a right of publicity within the
constitutional framework of the right to newsworthy information mandated by
the First Amendment.
II. THE YEAR OF THE NOBLE BIRTH-1890: THE CREATIVE GENIUS OF
WARREN AND BRANDEIS
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, who later was to become a
United States Supreme Court Justice, published an article entitled simply, The
Right to Privacy.3 This famous article was written in a period of history when
"yellow" journalism was just emerging and may be thought of as the legal seed
11. Ralph Waldo Emerson stated, "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,
adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines." Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance,
in 1 MAJOR WRITERS OF AMERICA 510, 513 (Perry Miller et al. ed., 1962).
12. See infra notes 162-200 and accompanying text.
13. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
[Vol. 54: 1
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY RIGHTS
that later gave birth to what today is recognized by the law as a right of
privacy. " These men criticized the press for "overstepping in every direction
the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency""5 and proposed a new tort for
the violation of privacy rights.'6 However, the seed took time to grow, and to
some extent, it remains in a growth period a hundred years later.
Warren and Brandeis were hard-pressed for leading case precedents that
would reinforce their argument for a privacy right. Nevertheless, early English
cases were found and used as the basis for the major premise of their
argument. 7 From these cases it was argued that, since the common law granted
a right of copyright to the artist in his paintings or etchings, 8 to the author in
his manuscript, 9 and to the letter-writer in his letter,2" in order to prevent their
14. The article stated:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and
of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as
well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations
are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the
indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be
procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The intensity and
complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered
necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining
influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that
solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but
modem enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy,
subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be
inflicted by mere bodily injury.
Id. at 196. Quaere: Has the attitude of journalism changed noticeably from the 1890s?
15. Id.
16. Id. at 213-20.
17. Id. Among the English cases cited are the following: Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40
L.T.R. 345 (Ch. App. 1888); Prince Albert v. Strange, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849), aff'd 64 Eng.
Rep. 293 (1849); Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 47 Eng. Rep. 1313 (1825); Yovatt v. Winyard, 37
Eng. Rep. 425 (1820).
18. Prince Albert v. Strange, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849). In Prince Albert the unauthorized
reproduction of the etchings done by Queen Victoria and Prince Albert of members of the Royal
Family, personal friends and some favorite dogs was prohibited. Privacy, in this case, was
recognized as a kind of property right. The court stated that "every man has a right to keep his
own sentiments if he pleases; he has certainly a right tojudge whether he will make them public,
or commit them only to the sight of his friends." Id. at 302.
19. Yovatt v. Winyard, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (1820). The Yovait court ordered that the
defendant stop using medical formulae and secret medicines which he had obtained
"surreptitiously" and "clandestinely" from the plaintiff when he was employed as his
journeyman. Id. at 426. Here was a theft of ideas, not things. However, the court based its order
on the reasoning that the defendant had breached the trust and confidence of his former
relationship with the plaintiff. Id.
20. It was determined in both Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818), and Woolsey v.
Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855), that equitable relief would be granted for invasion
of a property right. More specifically, in Gee, it was held that defendant, a bookseller who had
obtained copies of personal letters written both to and from the plaintiff and was printing and
about to publish them, would be enjoined from publishing those letters written by the plaintiff,
but not as to those written to him. Simply put, the court found the author of a letter has a property
2002]
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
products from being made public, ergo, every individual should have a similar
right not to have his personality invaded or published. It was also noted that
since the Roman law awarded damages for mental suffering when one's honor
was assailed wrongly, this was all the more reason why the American courts
should recognize a right of privacy.2
A. The Right of Privacy-A Simple Definition
The right of privacy, defined in its simplest terms, is the "right to be let
alone. 22 However, the Indiana courts have structured further the basic
definition to include the right to live without undue interference by the public
about matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned.23
interest in his own words. Thus, the right of publication remains in the sender of the letter. Gee,
36 Eng. Rep. at 678. In Woolsey the court held that should a receiver of a letter endeavor to
publish it or parts thereof from a writer, against the original author's wishes and not in
vindication of an unjust claim regarding the receiver's conduct, equity will recognize a breach
of the writer's exclusive property rights in the letters he wrote. Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 78-79.
See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed.
1984) (describing the development of a right to privacy).
In a more contemporary case heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
1987, it was held that a biographer seeking to quote and paraphrase various copyrighted letters
of J.D. Salinger written by Salinger to a number of individuals, which in turn had been placed
in the libraries of Harvard, Princeton, and the University of Texas and subject to library
copyright permissions for use, could not use these writings in a biography of Salinger being
written. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). Accordingly, a claim of
fair use under ordinary circumstances of the heretofore unpublished writings was denied-it
being determined that Salinger had "a right to protect the expressive content of his unpublished
writings for the term of his copyright." 1d. at 100.
21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 197-98.
22. JOHN LEWIS, 1 COOLEY ON TORTS 360-64 (3d ed. 1906) (discussing the right to be let
alone and noting that it is a personal, rather than property, right).
23. Cont'l Optical Co. v. Reed, 86 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 1949).
On this whole area of privacy, see generally the following: RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867
(1939); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 87-165 (1980); MORRIS L. ERNST &
ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE (1962); MILTON R. KONVITZ,
FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE: RELIGION, SPEECH, PRESS, ASSEMBLY 128-56
(1957); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOKOF THE LAW OF TORTS ch. 20 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter
PROSSER, HANDBOOK]; SAMUEL SPRING, RISKS & RIGHTS IN PUBLISHING, TELEVISION, RADIO,
MOTION PICTURES, ADVERTISING, AND THE THEATER (2d ed. 1956); WILLIAM ZELERMYER,
INVASION OF PRIVACY (1959); William M. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the
Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 212; Wilfred Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of
Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 713 (1948); Peter A. Fields, What's in a Stage Name?, 35 S. CAL.
L. REV. 149 (1962); Louis Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Developments, 39
MICH. L. REv. 526 (1941); Marion D. Patterson, Jr., Privacy: A Summary of the Past and
Present, 35 PA. BAR ASSOC. Q. 52 (1963); Roscoe Pound, The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Right of Privacy, 13 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 34 (1961); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L.
REV. 383 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Privacy]; Henry J. Reed, Privacy: A Brief Commentary,
1962 INS. L.J. 618; Leon R. Yanwick, The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope and
Limitations, 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 499 (1952); Comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-
Descriptive Confusion in the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 722 (1963)
[Vol. 54: 1
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Warren and Brandeis formulated broad guidelines for development of the
privacy right. They argued that (1) the right should not be used to restrict or
prohibit publication of matters which were of a public or general interest; (2)
the right ceased, as such, upon the publication of the facts by the individual or
with his consent, actual or implied; (3) the truth of the matter published should
not be an adequate defense; (4) absence of malice on the part of the publisher
himself should, further, be of no adequate defense to an invasion action; (5) in
the absence of special damages, the law should not, in all probability, grant any
redress for an invasion of privacy by a mere oral publication; and (6) the
common remedies available to an aggrieved party should be recognized as an
action for damages sounding in tort and, if the occasion warranted, use of the
injunctive process.24 Interestingly, the courts have followed generally these
guidelines and have both expanded and restricted their application according
to a case-by-case interpretation.
The fundamental qualification to right of privacy protection is "to whatever
degree and in whatever connection a man's life has ceased to be private, before
the publication under consideration has been made, to that extent the protection
is to be withdrawn. ' 25
B. Judicial v. Legislative Recognition
The progressive state of New York took the lead in 1903 in recognizing
privacy rights after its judiciary decided in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Company26 that, if positive action was to be taken within the general area of
privacy, the legislature, rather than the courts, should do so. 2 ' However, the
courts, for the most part, have achieved marked advances and success in
recognizing the need for a general right of privacy.28
[hereinafterDefense ofNewsworthiness]; Jerome D. Elbaum, Note, 48 CORNELLL.Q. 360 (1963);
Note, Right of Privacy vs. Free Press: Suggested Resolution of Conflicting Values, 28 IND. L.
J. 179 (1953) [hereinafter Note, Right of Privacy].
24. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 214-19.
25. Id. at 215.
26. 64 N.E. 442, 443-44 (N.Y. 1902). See generally Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual
Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803, 811-12 (2001) (discussing
Roberson).
27. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1903). Section 50 provides: "A person,
firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purpose of trade, the name, the
portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such
person, or ifa minor of his parents or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. § 50.
Section 51 provides that for violations of the preceding section, an aggrieved party may
obtain an injunction to prevent and restrain the illegal action, as well as recover an award of
damages. Id. § 51.
28. Protection of the right of privacy has received judicial approval in numerous jurisdictions.
See Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (discussing the right of privacy and
the right of publicity under Ohio law); Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publ'ns Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn.
1953) (applying Oklahoma law); Peay v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948); Smith v.
Doss, 37 So. 2d 118 (Ala. 1948); Reed v. Real Detective Publ'g Co., 162 P.2d 133 (Ariz. 1945);
2002]
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Startling though it may be, today England recognizes no legal right of
privacy.29 Instead, when cases arise that are concerned with privacy rights, the
courts will endeavor to stretch the law of unfair competition, defamation, or
copyright law to justify a compensatory award to the complainant, assuming
he wins on the merits.3 °
Dunlap v. McCarty, 678 S.W.2d 361 (Ark. 1984); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931)
(recognizing right to pursue happiness without improper infringement by others); Kom v. Rennison,
156 A.2d 476 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1959); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963);
Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga.
1905); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141 (Haw. 1968); Baker v. Burlington
N., Inc., 587 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1978); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952);
Cont'l Optical Co. v. Reed, 86 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. App. 1949); Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532 (Kan. 1918);
Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927); Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716 (La.
Ct. App. 1956); Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976); Beane v. McMullen, 291
A.2d 37 (Md. 1972); Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 33 N.W.2d 911 (Mich. 1948); Young v.
Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1990); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911); Sistok
v. Northwestern Tel. Sys., Inc., 615 P.2d 176 (Mont. 1980); Norman v. City of Las Vegas, 177 P.2d
442 (Nev. 1947); Frey v. Dixon, 58 A.2d 86 (N.J. Ch. 1948); Blount v. T D Publ'g Corp., 423 P.2d
421 (N.M. 1966); Brown v. Boney, 255 S.E.2d 784 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Munley v. ISC Fin. House,
Inc., 584 P.2d 1336 (Okla. 1978); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 113 P.2d 438 (Or. 1941); Clayman
v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940); Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606
(1956); Truxes v. Kenco Enter., Inc., 119 N.W.2d 914 (S.D. 1963); State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l
Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing the right of privacy and
its cousin, the right of publicity); Nat'l Bonding Agency v. Demeson, 648 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. App.
1983); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d 177 (Utah 1954); Staruski v. Cont'l
Tel. Co. of Vt., 581 A.2d 266 (Vt. 1990); Roach v. Harper, 105 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1958).
The question of a right of privacy has been left open in the following jurisdictions:
Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926); McCreery v. Miller's Groceteria Co., 64 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1936);
Kelley v. Post Publ'g Co., 98 N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1951).
See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 424-28 (2000) (describing the right of
privacy); KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, ch. 20 (same).
29. ERNST & SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 228.
30. Id. In the United Kingdom, a Press Complaints Commission is charged with
administering a Code of Practice, first published in 1991 and formulated by the newspaper and
magazine industries, which seeks to guide and shape issues of privacy in media coverage. See
Press Complaints Commission, Code of Practice, at http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/cop.asp (last
visited Sept. 26, 2002). The Code is not a legal document.
Under the section of the Code entitled "Privacy," an acknowledgment is made that
"[e]veryone is entitled to respect for his or her privacy and family life, home, health and
correspondence. A publication will be expected to justify intrusions into any individual's life
without consent." Id. Further, "[t]he use of long lens photography to take pictures of people in
private places without their consent is unacceptable." Id. Private places "are public or private
property where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. Journalists and photographers
are admonished not to seek information "through intimidation, harassment or persistent pursuit."
Id. Further, they are forbidden from photographing individuals in private places without consent
and "must not persist in telephoning, questioning, pursuing or photographing individuals after
having been asked to desist" "nor remain on their property after having been asked to leave and
must not follow them." Id.
Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones sought injunctive relief to prevent publication
of their wedding pictures in the British tabloid Hello!. Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., 2 All E.R. 289
(C.A. 2000). Plaintiffs asserted that an unknown guest, employee, or intruder had taken pictures
of their wedding, the exclusive rights to which the couple had previously sold to a competing
[Vol. 54: 1
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III. PROSSER'S DELINEATION OF THE PRIMARY RIGHT
A. The Classification-Its Problem
Dean Prosser has made a truly admirable attempt to classify the right of
privacy into four distinct torts.31 He classifies the Right of Privacy as follows:
intrusion upon the seclusion or solitude of another, public disclosure of private
facts, publicity that places another in a false light, and appropriation of
another's name or likeness for one's own advantage.32 Within the first group
are those cases in which the plaintiff's seclusion, solitude, or basic privacy has
been invaded wrongfully. The paradigmatic case in this group is De May v.
Roberts33 where a young man intruded upon a woman while she gave birth.34
The second group is comprised of situations where embarrassing private
facts are publicly disclosed. Melvin v. Reid,3" which may be the landmark case
in this area and as a commercial appropriations case, involved the production
of a movie about a former prostitute's life of sin, shame, and excitement.36
magazine, OK!. The Court of Appeal denied the claim for relief thereby allowing Hello! to
publish the photographs. Id. at 316.
Lord Justice Brooke opined that any newspaper flouting section three of the Press Code was
very likely to have its claim to freedom of expression trumped by privacy considerations. Id. at
314. Lord Justice Sedley concluded that "[t]he law no longer needs to construct an artificial
relationship of confidentiality between intruder and victim: it can recognise privacy itself as a
legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of personal autonomy." Id. at 320. See also
Mark Elliott, Privacy, Confidentiality and Horizontality: The Case of the Celebrity Wedding
Photographs, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 231 (2001) (concluding that English recognition of concept
of privacy is a welcome development).
31. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 23, § 97.
32. 1d.
33. 9N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).
34. Id. (allowing plaintiff to recover). Other examples of intrusion cases are Bednarik v.
Bednarik, 16 A.2d 80 (N.J. Ch. 1940) (addressing illegal compulsory blood test); Sutherland v.
Kroger Co., 110 S.E.2d 716 (W. Va. 1959) (considering illegal search of a woman's shopping
bag in a store); and Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931) (involving wiretapping of private
conversations).
35. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (allowing plaintiffto recover). In Melvin the court
states:
Where a person has by his own efforts rehabilitated himself, we, as right-
thinking members of society, should permit him to continue in the path of
rectitude rather than throw him back into a life of shame and crime. Even
the thief on the cross was permitted to repent during the hours of his final
agony.
Id. at 93.
The courts have recognized an invasion of the privacy right under this grouping where a
party's tardiness regarding his financial obligations have been published in a newspaper,
Trammell v. Citizen News Co., 148 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1941), or posted in a window on a public
street by one of his creditors, Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927). But see Patton v.
Jacobs, 78 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 1948) (holding it was no invasion of privacy to
communicate plaintiffs indebtedness to his employer).
36. Melvin, 297 P. at 91.
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Since her "formative" years, the prostitute had reformed and led a life of
respectability and sobriety as a housewife and a mother. When the movie was
produced, the most embarrassing and sordid incidents of her early life were
exposed for all to view.37 In cases of this nature, the aggrieved party must
demonstrate that the facts disclosed to the public were of a private nature rather
than of a public nature and, further, that they were offensive and objectionable
to a person of reasonable sensibilities.38
Publicity that tends to place the complainant in a false and negative light
in the public eye is the third tort of the right of privacy. For example, the use
of another's pictures,39 or even his voice,4° to illustrate a book, article, cartoon,
or advertisement with which he has no reasonable or valid connection has been
recognized as an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
The fourth and final classification, and the one with which this Article is
primarily concerned, is comprised of cases where there has been commercial
appropriation or unauthorized use of another's name or picture for profit. Cases
of this nature fall under the general subheading of the right of publicity.
Continental Optical Co. v. Reed,4 a leading case typical of this area, involved
the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's picture in an advertising campaign which
the defendant promoted. 2
Often, two or more-and quite conceivably all four-forms of invasion
may be found in the same case. For example, in a good number of the
commercial appropriation cases, the tort of putting one in a false light is
definitely at work. And many times when one is put in a false light, he is also
embarrassed about private facts disclosed in a false or fictitious manner.
The great majority of courts will only recognize a violation of the right of
privacy and not attempt to classify the offense into one of Prosser's four
groups.43 Dean Prosser suggests this is the "crux" of the whole problem in the
general area of privacy." While no one can doubt the eminence of Prosser in
the field of torts and his genuineness of purpose in formulating the privacy
classification, the cold fact remains that since the classification lacks stability
and certainty, particularly as to its divisional lines, one should be more satisfied
if a court sees fit to recognize a privacy invasion and not demand further
categorical precision.
37. Id.
38. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 23, at 394-97.
39. Peay v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (plaintiff's photograph used
to illustrate magazine article).
40. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
41. 86 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. App. 1949).
42. Id. at 307. See discussion infra Part IV.
43. For a general discussion of these four groups or subclassifications, see PROSSER,
HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 637-40; Prosser, Privacy, supra note 23.
44. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 23, at 407.
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As one scholar surmises, "Second Circuit Judge Jerome Frank severed the
right of publicity from the right of privacy,"45 which the Supreme Court in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 6 followed. Thus, "Publicity
rights thereafter came to be viewed as property rights protecting exclusively
economic interests, as opposed to 'personal' privacy rights, where the relevant
damage is to feelings and human dignity."47 Concurrent with this judicial
truncation, the publicity right was still tied to Prosser's fourth group of privacy
law. 8 Here is where the dilemma and uncertainty among policymakers
commences and considers whether the right to publicity is solely an economic
interest or one that incorporates the protection of personal autonomy. As will
be seen, California and Indiana have come the closest to walking the tightrope
between both views. 9
IV. COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION AND INVASIONS OF PRIVACY
"For Warren and Brandeis, privacy meant some degree of control,
recognized by tort law, over the dissemination of personal information to the
public by the press."5 The Indiana Court of Appeals has adopted the general
rule5" that an invasion of privacy consists of either
[t]he unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's
personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with
which the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful
intrusion into one's private activities, in such a manner as to
outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a
person of ordinary sensibility. 2
A. Acts of Appropriation
The commercial appropriation cases present a fairly unique situation
because their holdings have created for every individual something analogous
45. Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE
L.J. 383, 406 (1999).
46. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). See discussion infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
47. Haemmerli, supra note 45, at 407.
48. Id.
49. See discussion infra Part IX.
50. Note, Privacy, Photography, and the Press, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1087 (1998).
51. See R.T. Kimbrough, Annotation, Right of Privacy, 138 A.L.R. 22, 25 (1942).
52. Cont'l Optical Co. v. Reed, 86 N.E.2d 306,308 (Ind. App. 1949) (quoting Kimbrough,
supra note 51, at 25); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 ("A person who unreasonably and
seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his
likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other."). Comment (d) states that "liability exists
only if the defendant's conduct was such that he should have realized that it would be offensive
to persons of ordinary sensibilities. It is only where the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of
decency that liability accrues." Id. § 867 cmt. d.
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to a common law trademark in his own likeness or a "copyright" in his name
or image.53 The cases clearly indicate that courts will recognize a commercial
appropriation when a publication, which purports to disseminate news or
information, becomes either fictionalized or overdramatized1 4 An article
becomes fictionalized when it does more than merely report the event or news
item in question in a straightforward, factual manner.5 Quite naturally, if one
uses an element of another's character or personality to gain an economic
advantage or value for his product, this too is held to be a commercial
appropriation."
Celebrity personas may be appropriated freely for what are deemed to be
primarily "informational" and "entertainment" purposes.5 7 Except in rare
circumstances, "permission need not be obtained, nor payment made, for use
of a celebrity's name or likeness, in a news report, novel, play, film, or
biography,"58 as these are considered newsworthy information to which the
public should have free access. On the other hand, the commercial and
advertising values associated with celebrities are privately held.59 "By virtue of
what is now widely known as the 'right of publicity,' the 'commercial' value
of a celebrity's name, likeness, and other identifying characteristics is her
private property, which she may enjoy and exploit, transfer and bequeath, as
she alone thinks best. 60
Congress, in a bill not yet passed into law, and the State of California
define "'for commercial purposes' [as:] with the expectation of sale, financial
gain, or other consideration.",61
B. The Fact-fiction Differentiation
The fact-fiction differentiation, which is brought into play in commercial
appropriation cases, does not mean the factual material will be privileged.
Instead, what the differentiation merely suggests is, if the questioned material
53. Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense
of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2391 (1996).
54. Leverton v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 192 F.2d 974, 977 (3d Cir. 1951); Hazlitt v. Fawcett
Publ'ns, 116 F. Supp. 538, 545 (D. Conn. 1953); Reed v. Real Detective Publ'g Co., 162 P.2d
133 (Ariz. 1945); Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 239 P.2d 630, 635 (Cal. 1952).
55. Hazlitt, 116 F. Supp. at 545; Note, Right of Privacy, supra note 23, at 184.
56. See Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955);
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 81 (Ga. 1905) (finding that publication of
someone's picture without his consent, for mere advertising or pecuniary purposes, is an
invasion of the right of privacy); Cont 1 Optical Co., 86 N.E.2d at 309; Hinish v. Meier & Frank
Co., 113 P.2d 438, 448 (Or. 1941).
57. Madow, supra note 10, at 130.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. S.2103, 105th Cong. § 1822(a)(1)(A) (1998); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.80) (West Supp.
2002).
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is factual, its newsworthy value as a publication will be weighed against the
harm incurred by the person whom the writing concerns. However, if the
question matter is fictional, the possibility of balancing is foreclosed. 2 Thus,
a newspaper can report on the divorce of Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman as a
factual matter without incurring a lawsuit because the newsworthiness
outweighs the privacy interest. 6 In a recent case exemplifying this balancing
test, a federal judge dismissed Tommy and Pamela Anderson Lee's lawsuit
against Penthouse.64 The "stars" sued for invasion of privacy and commercial
gain because the magazine printed pictures of the couple partially clothed.65
The judge dismissed the case, saying the intimate photos were accompanied by
a "newsworthy" article and had been published earlier in other magazines,
making them no longer private.6
C. Public Figures and Their Loss of Privacy
Warren and Brandeis stated that a celebrity became a public figure, and
thus waived his privacy, only as to those matters already public and to those
which directly bore upon him.67 Unfortunately, the law today is not quite so
narrow. A public figure is defined usually as "[a] person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of life, or by adopting a profession or
calling.., gives the public a legitimate interest" in his affairs and character. 8
An individual who meets the above definition waives his right to privacy, not
only because he sought publicity and either consented actually or impliedly to
it, but also because his actions allowed his personality to become "public."69
Equally important is the fact that the press has a guaranteed privilege to inform
the public on all matters of public interest.70 This broad concept of "public
figure" has been held to include not only those individuals who have sought the
public eye, but also those who, through no effort of their own, are catapulted
involuntarily into the limelight by a newsworthy event.71
62. Note, Right of Privacy, supra note 23, at 184.
63. However, a divorce lawyer using the two celebrities images in an advertisement for his
services would face an action for infringement of publicity rights.
64. Judge Rules Lee Photos Are No Longer Private, BALT. SUN, Mar. 22, 1997, at 2D; Lees
Lose Out, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1997, at B3.
65. Lees Lose Out, supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 214-16.
68. Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 251 (Fla. 1944) (quoting 41 AM. JUR. Privacy § 18
(1942)).
69. Id. at 251.
70. Id. In Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280,282 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894), the court stated
"[a] statesman, author, artist, or inventor, who asks for and desires public recognition, may be
said to have surrendered this right to the public."
71. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940); Cason, 20 So. 2d at 251.
See Reed, supra note 23, at 619.
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Whether a lapse of time extinguishes the actual or implied consent given
by a public figure, and the press' corresponding privilege of reporting
"newsworthy" items, is a most crucial question. The rule is that a lapse of time
will not necessarily destroy the newsworthy nature of a public figure or a
public matter.72 In essence then, once someone becomes a public figure, he will
remain one. The 1963 case ofBarbieri v. New Journal Company73 states clearly
the law as "[a] lapse of time, in itself, [neither] recreates [nor] reinstates, a
plaintiff's prior right of privacy, because the right of the press to republish the
unpleasant facts still exists if those facts are 'newsworthy', i.e., if they still are
of legitimate public concern."74
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.7" is the leading case in the area of time lapse.
The court held that the publication of an article entitled" Where are they now?,"
which described in great detail the present and rather pathetic life of a former
child genius who graduated from Harvard at the age of sixteen but who since
that time had abandoned his widely publicized academic pursuits and fallen
into obscurity, was not an invasion of privacy.76 Thus, twenty-seven years after
his graduation from college, Sidis remained a newsworthy public figure.77
D. Stage Names
In construing the New York privacy statute,78 it has been held that the
statute protects only real or genuine names from commercial appropriation, not
merely professional names.79 However, this distinction is a most unjust refusal
by the court to allow an individual protection of his professional name under
72. Wagner v. Fawcett Publ'ns, 307 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962); Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ'ns,
Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d
773, 775 (Del. 1963).
73. 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963).
74. Id. at 775 (citation omitted). See also Wagner, 307 F.2d at 411 (holding that the
publication of stories of the rape-murder of plaintiffs daughter two months after the crime
occurred was current, and thus of "news value," on the sole basis that the evidence showed on
rehearing that legal proceedings were taking place against the accused at the time of the
publication).
75. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
76. Id. But cf McAndrews v. Roy, 131 So. 2d 256, 259 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (holding that
the plaintiff's right of privacy was invaded because ten years was too much of a lapse of time
between the date of original authorization for use of his picture and the date of publication).
77. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
78. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1992).
79. Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 195, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). In this
leading case, the plaintiff was a psychic who had adopted and used the stage name of
"Cassandra" in her capacity as both a fortune-teller and an author-lecturer. Id. at 195. She
complained that the defendant's production of a movie entitled "Countess Cassandra" portrayed
the fictitious countess as a "doubledealing" fortune teller and, as such, invaded her privacy and
appropriated her name for commercial use. Id. at 196. Accord West v. Lind, 9 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (doubting that the actress Mae West had a "property right" in the stage
name "Diamond Lil"). But see Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928)
(holding Charlie Chaplin's name, as well as his dress and pantomime techniques, is protected).
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a privacy theory. The courts have seemingly overlooked the fact that stage
names often become so identified with a particular individual as to become an
aspect of his true identity and personality. However, where the personal name
is the real name of the complaining party, there is no question today that the
name will be protected if sufficient invasion is shown.80
E. Commercial Advertising
Advertising campaigns are always fertile ground for privacy invasions. In
the advance publicity campaign for one of its new movies, a defendant motion
picture studio published fictitious letters by the leading actress of the
forthcoming production."1 The letter was rather "suggestive," and, as the fates
would have it, the actress who signed the letter had the same name as the
plaintiff.82 Although the defendant had no intent whatsoever to refer in his
letters to the plaintiff-and further did not even know of her existence-the
court found that the plaintiff's privacy had been invaded, stating, "The question
is not so much who was aimed at as who was hit.
83
Reenactments in the movies of heroism and the daring of law enforcement
agents and others, 4 as well as expositions of athletic prowess, such as Babe
Ruth's home-run techniques,85 have been allowed under aprivilege of reporting
and commenting on "news matters." The radio and television networks may
80. Fields, supra note 23, at 149. See also Dawn H. Dawson, Note, The Final Frontier:
Right of Publicity in Fictional Characters, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 662-68 (arguing for a
federal statute which would grant to an actor portraying a fictional character a right of publicity
in the character to the extent the actor's own character's use evokes the very identity of the actor
himself).
81. Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 127 P.2d 577, 578 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
82. Id. at 579. The letter read:
Dearest:
Don't breath it to a soul, but I'm back in Los Angeles and more
curious than ever to see you. Remember how I cut up about a year ago?
Well, I'm raring to go again, and believe me I'm in the mood for fun.
Let's renew our acquaintanceship and I promise you an evening you
won't forget. Meet me in front of Warners Downtown Theater at 7th and
Hill on Thursday. Just look for a girl with a gleam in her eye, and a smile
on her lips and mischief on her mind!
Fondly,
Your ectoplasmic playmate,
Marion Kerby
Id. at 579.
83. Id. at 581 (quoting Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 126 NE. 260, 262 (N.Y. 1920). But
cf O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding plaintiff waived his
right of privacy in part because he was the most publicized football player of 1938 and 1939 and
therefore could receive no injunction or damages for use of his picture in full uniform for
advertising purposes by Pabst Blue Ribbon Beer Sales Company).
84. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 178 N.Y.S. 752.(N.Y. App. Div. 1919).
85. Ruth v. Educ. Films, Inc., 184 N.Y.S. 948 (1920).
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also comment about news events or "public figures" and further dramatize
these events if in the public interest.8 6
F. Animals, Decedents and Corporate Bodies
An individual's legal right is a personal right and does not extend, for
example, to members of his own family unless their individual right of privacy
is also invaded. 7 Further, the right is neither assignable8 nor does it survive
after death 9 unless statutes so provide. Thus, when the questionable publication
concerns a deceased person, the members of his immediate family have no
right of action for invasion of their privacy unless they themselves were
substantially featured in the article, notwithstanding any embarrassment,
shame, or humiliation they may have suffered.9"
Of interest is the fact that animals9' and corporate bodies92 are not protected
by the right of privacy. As stated in Rosenwasser v. Ogoglia,3 the privacy right
of an individual must be limited to natural beings simply because the main
purpose of the right to privacy is to enhance and ensure human peace and
happiness.94 However, corporations are adequately protected against misuse of
their names under the law of trademarks and unfair competition.
G. The Indiana Position
A significant Indiana case on invasion of privacy through commercial
appropriations is Continental Optical Company v. Reed.95 Here, the plaintiff,
86. Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 143, 151 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Cohen
v. Marx, 211 P.2d 320, 321 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949); ZELERMYER, supra note 23, at 125-37.
87. Rozhon v. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc., 230 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1956); Coverstone v. Davies,
239 P.2d 876, 881 (Cal. 1952).
88. Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 1935).
89. Rohzon, 230 F.2d at 359; Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285, 285 (Mich.
1899). But see Estate ofPresley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354-55 (D.N.J. 1981).
90. Runyon v. United States, 281 F.2d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1960); Bradley v. Cowles
Magazines, Inc., 168 N.E.2d 64, 66 (111. App. Ct. 1960). But see Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp.,
155 S.E. 194, 197 (Ga. 1930) (allowing recovery to the parents whose deformed child was
photographed, without their permission, while in the hospital for treatment). The Bazemore court
stressed that it was recognizing a right of privacy in the living, the parents in this case, rather
than in the dead. Id. at 197.
91. Cf Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 106 N.Y.S. 2d 553, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951)
(holding that New York's privacy law was inapplicable to animal trainer's act).
92. Vassar Coll. v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982, 985 (W.D. Mo. 1912).
93. 158 N.Y.S. 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916).
94. Id. at 57.
95. 86 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. App. 1949). In fact, only three other cases were found within the
whole general area of privacy: State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 74 N.E.2d 914 (Ind. 1947),
Voelker v. Tyndall, 75 N.E.2d 549 (Ind. 1947) and Patton v. Jacobs, 78 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1948). Both Mavity and Voekler held that, although a citizen may have a right in his
fingerprints as well as his photograph, the need for the state to establish and maintain an efficient
and coordinated system of identification in its law enforcement activities gives it the privilege
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an optical lens grinder by trade, brought this action claiming that the defendant
optical company used his photographic likeness for advertising purposes
without first receiving his authorization.96 The trial court awarded the plaintiff
$20,000 in damages.97 However, on appeal a remittur was ordered of$19,000.98
While plaintiff was serving in the army during World War II with a mobile
optical unit near the frontlines in France, his photograph was taken by the army
in an attempt to bolster the home-front morale.99 Subsequently, the picture
appeared in many United States publications, and the defendant proceeded to
appropriate it as part of its advertising layout. Plaintiff claimed his picture, by
innuendo, represented falsely to the public that he endorsed the defendant's
products; that his privacy was invaded; and that, because of the picture, he
himself could not advertise effectively in his own private business as an
optician.' °
The appellate court held that although the plaintiff became a "public
person" when he entered the service, thereby waiving his privacy as to his
service activities, he had not given an unrestricted license to private business
for use of the photograph in merchandising and advertising.l"l
In retrospect, then, it is seen that the truth,102 mistake,0 3 absence of
malice, 10 4 nor lack of special damages is a defense to a privacy action.' In fact,
substantial damages may even be awarded for presumed mental distress
inflicted and other probable harm without proof of actual damages. 6 Consent,
either real or implied, and the privilege of reporting and commenting about
newsworthy matters are the only real defenses available in this area of
discussion."7
of taking pictures and fingerprints of all individuals who violate the law and who are arrested,
irrespective of whether such individuals are later acquitted. Mavity, 74 N.E.2d at 917; Voelker,
75 N.E.2d at 550-5 1. Because of this state privilege there can be no valid claim for invasion of
privacy on the part of a citizen involved in a similar situation in Indiana.
96. Cont 'l Optical, 86 N.E.2d at 307-10.
97. Id. at 307.
98. Id. at 310.
99. Id. at 308.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 308-10.
102. Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 970 (Ky. 1927). One possible exception to this rule
is found in cases where the plaintiff is put in a "false light" before the public. Prosser, Privacy,
supra note 23, at 419.
103. Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. 1942).
104. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1940); Kerby v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 127 P.2d 577, 581 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
105. Reed v. Real Detective Publ'g Co., 162 P.2d 133, 139 (Ariz. 1945) (citations omitted).
106. Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 110 S.E.2d 716, 724 (W. Va. 1959).
107. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 23, at 419-21.
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H. The California Judicial Approach
In contrast, the Supreme Court of California in Polydoros v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.1"8 examined a case in which a man's name and
likeness were copied allegedly for the main character in the movie "The
Sandlot."' 09 The court ruled that filmmakers could base fictional characters on
real people, even using their names and likenesses, without violating the right
to privacy as long as they did not defame the person or intrude on the person's
private life."'
The appellant did not establish a direct connection between the use of his
name or likeness and a commercial purpose."' "As a matter of law, mere
similarity or even identity of names is insufficient to establish a work of fiction
is of and concerning a real person.""..2 The court also went on to observe that
"[fjilm is a 'significant medium for the communication of ideas' and, whether
exhibited in theaters or on television, is protected by constitutional guarantees
of free expression.""'
V. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. The Guarantee of Freedom of the Press and the Need
for an "Informed" Citizenry Versus the Right to be Let Alone
It has been said that publicity rights force us away from "[a] society in
which all persons are free and able to participate actively, if not equally, in the
generation and circulation of meanings and values.""' 4 In a democracy,
preservation of individual liberties is of prime importance. However, equally
important to the stability of democracy is the ever-vigilant press-whose
express duty it is to engender and, indeed, create a forum of ideas, and to
provide information upon which rational self-rule may be based.
It would seem that the freedom of the press must include two inseparable
elements: the publisher's right to publish and the people's right to an adequate
press. While the First Amendment ensures that no law will be made which
abridges freedom of speech or the press," 6 this very basic constitutional
108. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
109. Id. at 208.
110. Id. at 212.
111. Id. at 210.
112. Id. at 209 (quoting Aguilar v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 219 Cal. Rptr. 891, 892
(Ct. App. 1997)).
113. Id. at 210 (citations omitted).
114. Madow, supra note 10, at 146. See generally Thomas Glenn Martin, Jr., Rebirth and
Rejuvenation in a Digital Hollywood: The Challenge Computer-Simulated Celebrities Present
for California 's Antiquated Right of Publicity, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 99 (1996) (discussing
harmonizing the right of publicity with the use of computer-simulated celebrities).
115. Note, Right of Privacy, supra note 23, at 181.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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principle comes into direct conflict with the legal right of privacy." 7 To give
one is to deprive the other."' Therefore, a thin line of demarcation must be
drawn carefully on a case-by-case analysis.
Justice Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States,"9
stated that "the right to be let alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men."'2 ° He added, "To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.''. In Wolf v. Colorado22 Justice Frankfurter took the
position that the right of due process guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment could always be used to enforce basic rights (i.e., the right of
privacy) inherent in a free society.'23
In 1952, the Supreme Court held in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson'24 that
not only was a motion picture to be considered part of the press, but that all
forms of communication were to be recognized as fulfilling an important role
in furnishing an adequate press. 2
5
Names are News. This is a primary tenet of the modem journalist. News
generally includes all events and items of information out of the ordinary
humdrum routine of daily life which have that "indefinable quality of interest,
which attracts public attention." '26 Therefore, news would include the birth of
a child to a twelve-year-old girl,'27 as well as a suicide. 28 For the most part,
courts have been quite liberal in interpreting almost any article which appears
in a newspaper as news, regardless of whether it is printed in news columns,
feature pages, or magazine sections.
29
So far as the First Amendment is concerned, the basic test of limitation is
that "the right of the press in disseminating news is paramount to an
individual's right of privacy" when such news is of general interest to the
community. 30 Thus, the chief question posited by every privacy problem is
117. See generally KONVITZ, supra note 23, at 131 (discussing the "clash" between the
right to be let alone and the right to print the truth); Pound, supra note 23, at 43 (noting that the
freedom of the press is a "competing right"); Defense of Newsworthiness, supra note 23, at 723
(noting possible collision with freedom of expression); Note, Right of Privacy, supra note 23
(noting that the right of privacy and the freedom of the press clash repeatedly).
118. Patterson, supra note 23, at 52-54.
119. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
120. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
123. Id. at 27-28.
124. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
125. Id. at 499-502.
126. Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1936) (quoting
Associated Press v. Int'l News Serv., 245 F. 244, 248 (2d Cir. 1917)).
127. Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 333, 95 S.E.2d 606, 607 (1956).
128. Samuel v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 122 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
129. Defense of Newsworthiness, supra note 23, at 731 n.28.
130. Patterson, supra note 23, at 54.
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whether the educational and news value of a movie, drama, or written
publication, weighed in relation to the ever-present commercial factor, and in
respect to the individual's harm, is sufficient to permit publication without
liability.
VI. WHAT OF THIS SO-CALLED "RIGHT OF PUBLICITY?"
As a preliminary matter, right of publicity protection does not require the
plaintiff to have celebrity status. If the cases that best illustrate the current state
of the law often involve celebrities, it is because the more widely known the
plaintiff, the greater the commercial value of his identity, and the more likely
the advertiser will engage in conduct leading to litigation with respect to that
identity."' The right of publicity, in its simplest form, is the right to control the
commercial use of one's persona.'32
A. Recognizing a Right of Publicity
Uproar Co. v. NBC'33 is regarded as the first reported case where the courts
inferred that they would recognize a right of publicity. "' Judge Jerome Frank,
twenty-three years later, firmly enunciated the legal status of this new right.'35
Today, the right of publicity is based largely upon the realization that even
though a complaining party may have waived some or all of his privacy rights,
his very name or picture may have such a monetary or otherwise commercial
value that the defendant, by use thereof, would gain an unfair economic
131. See Alexander C. Giftos, The Common Law Right of Publicity and Commercial
Appropriation of Celebrity Identity: "A Whole New Wardrobe for Vanna," 38 ST. Louis U. L.J.
983,985 (1994) (listing celebrity plaintiffs who have been involved in right of publicity actions).
132. Jonathan L. Faber, Indiana: A Celebrity-friendly Jurisdiction, REs GESTAE, Mar.
2000, at 24.
133. 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934).
134. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 219
(1954).
135. Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
Judge Frank stated:
[I]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy.... a man has a
right in the publicity value of his photograph ....
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of
their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received
money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their
countenances .... This right of publicity would usually yield them no
money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.
Id. at 868.
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advantage or profit when the benefits belong rightfully to the complainant
himself.'36
B. The Supreme Court Speaks
The Supreme Court formally recognized in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.'37 that the right of publicity is a valid cause of action. 3
Zacchini involved the plaintiff's human cannonball act performed at a county
fair.'39 Apparently, a local news program had taped the plaintiffs act and
subsequently broadcast the act in its entirety on the evening news.140 In
overturning the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling, the United States Supreme Court
held that the television station was not shielded by the First Amendment.' 41 It
viewed the unauthorized telecast of the plaintiff's human cannonball act as a
threat to the economic value of his act. 42 The Court noted that free access to
the entirety of the plaintiffs act would deter paid attendance by a public
otherwise willing to pay the cost of admission.' 43 It stated that "[n]o social
purpose is served by having the defendant get for free some aspect of the
plaintiff that would have market value and [for] which [the defendant] would
normally pay."'" While the Zacchini case does not concern the use of the
plaintiff's act to advertise a particular product, it does stand for the proposition
that misuse of a particular attribute of a right of publicity might impair the
future economic value of the attribute. The Court "focus[ed] on the right of the
individual to reap the reward of his endeavors."' 45 Public broadcast of the
plaintiffs act was seen to have the potential to sate the public's appetite for
daring deeds, enough to conjure up the old adage: "Why buy the cow if you're
getting the milk for free?"
136. Fields, supra note 23, at 157; see also Nimmer, supra note 134, at 205 (noting that
the right of privacy is inadequate because it does not protect celebrities from the appropriation
by others of the valuable use of his name or portrait).
137. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 563.
140. Id. at 563-64.
141. Id. at 579.
142. Id. at 575.
143. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.
144. Id. at 576 (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)).
145. Haemmerli, supra note 45, at 401 (quoting Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573). See also
Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of
Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TuL. L. REv. 836, 858-65 (1983) (discussing Zacchini and
noting that the case requires some assessment of the extent to which the plaintiffs property
interest was impaired by the defendant's action).
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VII. CASE PRECEDENTS
In Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc.'" the court dealt with a
common law claim of right of publicity.147 The court held that entertainer Guy
Lombardo had an actionable claim for violation of his right of publicity.'48 In
Lombardo the defendant ran a television advertisement where an actor, bearing
no resemblance to the plaintiff, depicted a bandleader "with the same gestures,
musical beat and choice of music ... with which plaintiff had been associated
in the public's mind for several decades."' 149 Notwithstanding the lack of
resemblance, the court viewed the defendant's actions as an appropriation of
the plaintiffs identity in which he "had invested 40 years"' 5 and which had
"'some marketable status.''. The court called the use of Lombardo's identity
"deceptive" without elaboration.'
Lahr v. Abell Chemical Co. ' illustrates clearly the problem that this new,
emerging right of publicity encounters in the courts. In Lahr, Bert Lahr, a
professional actor and entertainer well-known for his distinctive style of "vocal
comic delivery" involving an "original combination of pitch, inflection, accent
and comic sounds," maintained an action against the defendant company
alleging invasion of privacy, defamation, and unfair competition.'1 4 The
defendant, advertising the detergent "Lestoil," produced a filmed commercial
that featured an animated cartoon of a talking duck whose voice simulated and
mimicked Lahr's.' Although the lower court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action,'56 the appellate court reversed, stating that
although Lahr had no cause of action for invasion of privacy under either
Massachusetts or New York law, the allegations were sufficient to sustain the
complaint on grounds of defamation and unfair competition.' 7
It is important to note that defamation is designed as a remedy to
compensate for injury to reputation."' This being so, it is a rather ineffectual
basis for recovery of the value of any commercial appropriations. However, the
right of privacy is much broader than defamation because it is designed as a
remedy for invasion of an individual's feelings or right to be left alone.'59
146. 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
147. Id. at 663.
148. Id. at 665.
149. Id. at 665 (Titone, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 664.
151. Id.
152. Lombardo, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
153. 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
154. Id. at 257.
155. Id.
156. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 195 F. Supp. 702, 704 (D. Mass. 1961).
157. Lahr, 300 F.2d at 258-59.
158. PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 23,§ 92.
159. See KoNVITZ, supra note 23, at 128-36 (discussing Brandeis and Warren's foundation
for the right of privacy).
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Stated otherwise, an action for commercial appropriation is chiefly designed to
protect a commercial interest, whereas an action for defamation is primarily
designed to safeguard a dignitary interest of an aggrieved party.16 Moreover,
special damages in publicity actions do not have to be alleged and proved, as
in defamation.' 6
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 62 involved a plaintiff who
was a well-known race car driver.'63 The plaintiff alleged that the use of a color
photograph of his race car in defendant's television advertisement
misappropriated his name, likeness, personality, and endorsement."6 The
defendant had changed the numbers on all race cars in the background and on
the plaintiffs car in the foreground of the advertisement.16 Additionally, the
defendant added a "spoiler" to the plaintiffs car.'66 The defendant had also
removed and changed advertisements on the plaintiffs car to reflect an
endorsement of the defendant's product. 67 Other than these three minor
alterations, the defendants did nothing else to alter the appearance of the
plaintiff s car. 168 Plaintiff contended that the design and decoration of his race
car was so distinctive and individualized that, despite defendant's alteration, the
car was instantly recognizable as his. 69 While his name and likeness were not
used at any point in the advertisement, the court held that the facts supported
a triable issue for a jury. 7 The court determined that an individual not only has
a proprietary interest in his image, name, and likeness, but he also has a
proprietary interest in his "identity."'' Conceivably, a jury could have found
that the defendant's actions misled the public into believing that the plaintiff
endorsed defendant's product.
160. Fred M. Weiler, The Right of Publicity Gone Wrong: A Case for Privileged
Appropriation ofIdentity, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 223, 228 (1994). Weiler is quick to cite
examples showing that the harm incurred by the celebrity whose right to publicity has been
violated will not always be exclusively monetary. For instance, he suggests that the celebrity
may find the very act of celebrity endorsements to be repugnant. And even the celebrity for
whom compensated advertising is an option may have cause for concern that his image and
reputation are being linked with a product which is in his estimation of inferior quality. Lastly,
Weiler suggests that the injured celebrity may be subject to ridicule among his colleagues,
unaware of the unauthorized nature of the advertising, for selling out. Id. at 228 n.4 1. (referring
to Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 439 n.11 (Cal. 1979)).
161. See Reed v. Real Detective Publ'g Co., 162 P.2d 133, 139 (Ariz. 1945) (citations
omitted); Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 110 S.E.2d 716, 724 (W. Va. 1959).
162. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
163. Id. at 822.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822 (9th Cir. 1974).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 827.
171. Id. at 825.
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InMidler v. FordMotor Co.'7 the Ninth Circuit had occasion to review the
claim of singer/actress Bette Midler for invasion of her right of publicity.'73
Contrary to Lahr,7 4 the right addressed by the court in Midler was derived
from the common law right of privacy, 7 ' not the common law defamation
action. Similar to Lahr, Midler involved the use of a celebrity sound-alike by
a company for several of its advertisements.' 76
The defendant, Ford Motor Company, aired television spots featuring a
rendition of the song "Do You Want To Dance?,"' 77 which Bette Midler had
recorded in 1973.178 The court noted that Ford had hired a former background
singer from Midler's band after attempts to hire Midler had failed. 179 The hired
singer was told to sound as much like Midler as possible. Although neither
Midler's name nor picture appeared anywhere in the advertisement, many
people who saw it were convinced that the voice in the commercial was
Midler's."0 Finding in favor of Midler, the court said "the defendants here used
an imitation to convey the impression that Midler was singing for them."' 8' The
court declared the defendant's conduct was an appropriation of the attributes
of the plaintiffs identity.'82 "A voice," the court said, "is as distinctive and
personal as a face. The human voice is one of the most palpable ways identity
is manifested. We are all aware that a friend is at once known by a few words
on the phone."" 3
The Ninth Circuit next dealt with the "voice misappropriation" issue in
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 14 In this case, singer/songwriter Tom Waits alleged
that the defendant misappropriated his voice by hiring an impersonator to sing
a version of his 1976 song "Step Right Up"' 5 for one of its line of snack-
foods.8 6 Invoking Midler the Ninth Circuit found that, when a "voice is a
sufficient indicia of a celebrity's identity, the right of publicity protects against
its imitation for commercial purposes without the celebrity's consent.'87
Finding that the advertisement used Waits distinctive singing style coupled
172. 849 F.2d 460 (1988).
173. Id.
174. See discussion supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
175. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
176. Id. at 461.
177. BETrE MIDLER, Do You Want to Dance?, on THE DEVINE MISS M. (Atlantic Records
1972).
178. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 461-62.
181. Id. at 463.
182. Id. at 463-64.
183. Id. at 463.
184. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
185. ToM WAITS, Step Right Up, on SMALL CHANGE (Asylum Records 1976).
186. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097. "Ironically, this song is a jazzy parody of commercial
hucksterism, and consists of a succession of humorous advertising pitches." Id.
187. Id. at 1098.
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with the actual use of one of his songs, the court upheld the jury's verdict for
Waits.188 The plaintiff's consistent complaint seems to have been that the
advertisement conveyed the impression that he had endorsed the product." 9
The Ninth Circuit further expanded the right of publicity in White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. '90 In this case, which involved television
game show personality Vanna White, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff
had alleged facts sufficient to show that the defendant, a VCR manufacturer,
misappropriated her identity. 9' The defendant had run a series of
advertisements depicting a robot dressed in a blond wig, evening gown, and
jewelry standing in front of a game-show letter board similar to the one used
on Wheel of Fortune.'92 The advertisement attempted to suggest that
defendant's products would be in good working order long enough to see a
robot take White's place on Wheel ofFortune.9 Despite the fact that the robot
itself bore no physical resemblance to Vanna White, the court held that it was
sufficient that the robot and its background evoked her image.'94
The court noted that in order to satisfy a claim of right of publicity, a
plaintiff may allege the following: "(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiffs
identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiffs name or likeness to defendant's
advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting
injury."'9 5 Because the wording of previous case law appeared to be permissive
rather than restrictive, the court viewed a claim for right of publicity
expansively.'96 Therefore, the concern was not whether the defendant used the
name or likeness of White, for it was clear that her name was not used and that
the robot was not her likeness."' Rather, the court focused on whether the
plaintiff's identity was appropriated at all and that determination was not
limited to the use of the plaintiff s name or likeness.'98 Samsung also argued
without success that their advertisements consisted of protected speech,
because the advertisements were parodies of Vanna White and Wheel of
Fortune.'99 The court dismissed quickly this defense, suggesting that a parody
188. Id. at 1112.
189. Id. at 1103.
190. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
191. Id. at 1399.
192. Id. at 1396.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1399.
195. Id. at 1397 (citing Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983)).
196. White, 971 F.2d at 1397.
197. Id. at 1398-99.
198. Id. at 1398.
199. Id. at 1401. The defendants cited Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988),
and L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987), for the proposition that
parodies are protected speech. These cases involved parodies of advertisements run for the
purpose of poking fun at evangelist Jerry Falwell and outdoor outfitter L.L. Bean. White, F.2d
at 1401.
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claim would be better suited to "non-commercial parodies,"2 ° and went on to
say that a parody must be for its own sake and not for the sake of advancing
sales of a particular product to be protected.20 ' "The difference between a
'parody' and a 'knock-off is the difference between fun and profit."20 2
More recently in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,203 Los Angeles
Magazine created a photo spread using digitally altered celebrity images from
famous movie still shots without their authorization.2 4 The magazine digitally
manipulated the images to appear as if the celebrities were wearing modem
designer clothes.20 5 Dustin Hoffman asserted his right of publicity against the
magazine publisher for use of the infamous photo of his character "Tootsie.
'2 °6
The magazine had dressed Tootsie in a Richard Tyler gown and Ralph Lauren
heels.207 Despite the fact that there was no suggestion that Hoffman endorsed
the article or the designers, the court awarded Hoffman over three million
dollars for violation of his publicity rights, which included compensatory,
punitive damages, and attorney fees.20 8
The verdicts in these decisions, supporting the right ofpublicity, reveal two
basic policy themes. The manipulation of an individual's image, especially that
of a celebrity or public figure, has been a trend to hype products and increase
revenues. The courts have moved to ensure at least that the profits derived from
these valuable personas are more equitably channeled. Additionally, the
judiciary, as evidenced by the holdings in the preceding cases, has maintained
that a person should have the right to control how his image is commercialized,
or if it will be used at all.20 9 Thus, proponents of the right to publicity argue that
the "ability to control commercialization in the first place is as much a policy
objective of the Right of Publicity as is providing revenue streams for the
rightful recipient."1 0 Others maintain that the direction these cases have taken
toward the protection of individuals who have stepped consciously into the
limelight creates a slippery slope that may infringe upon First Amendment
rights and the creation of a popular or contemporary culture.2 1'
200. White, F.2d at 1401.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
204. Id. at 870.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 875-76.
209. Faber, supra note 132, at 28.
210. Id.
211. Madow, supra note 10, at 138 ("[P]ublicity rights facilitate private censorship of
popular culture."). Madow goes on to state:
The judicial and academic rhetoric on publicity rights makes reference to
"economic incentives," "natural rights," and "unjust enrichment." The
subtext, however, is control over the production and circulation of
meaning in our society. This is so because star images are widely used in
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VIII. HAVE THE COURTS GONE Too FAR IN PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY?
A. The Slippery Slope: No End in Sight for Things Protected
Case law indicates that the right of publicity not only protects against the
misappropriation of a name, face, voice, likeness, and identity, but that it
protects the mere evocation of a celebrity's image.2"2 The evocation of identity
has the effect of creating a publicity right violation where a defendant has
merely employed advertising techniques that remind the public of a particular
performer.2"3 Such a test does not insist on a showing a realistic rendering of
the plaintiff; it merely requires a showing that the questioned conduct reminds
the audience of the celebrity.
21 4
Critics suggest that the absurdity of the result in White can be best
illustrated by the logical extreme of its application.215 For instance, any song
previously popularized by a particular celebrity that is used in an advertisement
could conceivably be viewed as a violation of that celebrity's right of publicity,
because it might conjure up in the public's mind's eye that celebrity's
identity. 216 For example, it is well known that Frank Sinatra's signature song
is "My Way." Suppose that an advertiser secures a license from the copyright
holder of the song to use it in a commercial. If, in the advertisement, "My
Way 2 17 is sung in a manner not even remotely resembling Sinatra's rendition,
its use would still not stand because, arguably, the song's association with
Sinatra would evoke the identity of Frank Sinatra. Such a test ensures virtually
contemporary American culture to create and communicate meaning and
identity .... Indeed, it is only because celebrity images carry and provoke
meaning that they can enhance the marketability of the commodities with
which they are associated.
Id. at 142. See also JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW
(1991) (arguing current intellectual property law may be curtailing popular cultural production);
Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws
and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1853, 1855 (1991) (arguing that in the current
climate "intellectual property laws stifle dialogic practices-preventing us from using the most
powerful, prevalent, and accessible cultural forms to express identity, community, and
difference"); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 157 (1992) (observing that the recent judicial trend
toward recognizing new intellectual property rights "sometimes may interfere impermissibly
with the autonomy of others and with efforts by individuals to achieve cultural self-
determination").
212. Sudakshina Sen, Comment, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of
Publicity, 59 ALB. L. REv. 739, 751 (1995).
213. Weiler, supra note 160, at 258.
214. Steven C. Clay, Note, Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights
in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REv. 485, 497-98 (1994).
215. Sen, supra note 212, at 751-52 (citing Weiler, supra note 160, at 258).
216. Id. at751.
217. FRANK SINATRA, My Way, on MY WAY (Warner Brothers 1987).
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that unauthorized commercial use of anything remotely associated with a
particular celebrity will violate that celebrity's right of publicity.21 Perhaps the
result in Midler would have been the same under White even if the singer had
been male and sounded nothing like Bette Midler. 19 The dissent in White
enumerates the effect of applying the majority's view.22° In a classic slippery-
slope argument the dissent suggests: "Gene Autry could have brought an
action against all other singing cowboys. Clint Eastwood would be able to sue
anyone who plays a tall, soft-spoken cowboy, unless, of course, Jimmy Stewart
had not previously enjoined Clint Eastwood. '1221
B. Parody and Satire-Valuable Weapons in Social Discourse
Expansion of the protection the right of publicity affords may limit the
public's ability to conduct a fruitful discourse on the very meaning and value
associated with celebrity.222 An expansive understanding of the right will leave
it difficult for the general public to penetrate the "clique of celebrity
personality" and a variety of other societal conditions, thus depriving society
the meaningful multiplicity of ideas which would further a constructive
dialogue. 23
Commercials have the capacity to inform social commentary as well as
entertain. 4 Assisting in that dialogue is the art of parody and satire. In White
the court rejected Samsung's claim of parody noting that, while parody at some
level insists on an evocation of the identity of the celebrity, commercial parody
is subservient to the purpose of selling the product for which the parody is
conducted.22 ' The majority ignored the dissent's observation that the parodist,
in a supposedly non-commercial context, indulges in comic technique for the
purpose of marketing himself or whatever is the vehicle for the parody in
question.226 In other words, the dissent observed that all parody implicates a
commercial evocation of celebrity. A later dissent from a denial of rehearing
stated: "Is the Samsung parody any different from a parody on Saturday Night
Live or in Spy Magazine? Both are equally profit-motivated. Both use a
celebrity's identity to sell things-one to sell VCRs, the other to sell
advertising. "227
218. Sen, supra note 212, at 752.
219. Weiler, supra note 160, at 259.
220. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1992) (Alarcon,
J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 1407.
222. Sen, supra note 212, at 753.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 756 (citations omitted).
225. White, 971 F.2d at 1401.
226. Id. at 1407.
227. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,
C.J. dissenting).
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While the speech involved in White was commercial in nature, it is still
entitled to some (albeit a lesser) degree of protection.228 In order for commercial
speech to be restricted, it must either be found to be misleading or related to an
unlawful activity. Absent both of these elements, the state must assert a
substantial interest achieved by the restriction on the speech.229 Even in the
event of a substantial state interest, the judiciary must also inquire if the interest
would be better served by less restrictive means. 230 The dissent to the denial for
rehearing in White points out that the majority at no time attempted to apply the
requisite balancing that commercial speech claims demand.23" ' Moreover, the
only reference to constitutional protection afforded commercial speech was the
majority's insistence that commercial speech is entitled to less protection. 232
IX. A FURTHER STEP: CALIFORNIA AND INDIANA RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. Jurisdictional Statutes-Privacy Post-Mortem
Currently, sixteen states recognize the right of publicity through statutory
enactment.233 Furthermore, the "majority view is that the right exists by
common law in every state that has not defined" a statutory position.234 This
Article focuses on two of the most recent and far-reaching right of publicity
statutes and their implications. As observed, the reason for growth in publicity
privacy statutes is due to the rapid advancement of digital manipulation
228. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
229. Id. at 564.
230. Id.
231. White, 989 F.2d at 1520.
232. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992).
233. Faber, supra note 132, at 28 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1995)); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. 32-36-13-1 to -20 (Michie 1995); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Banks-Baldwin 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West
1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § § 20-201 to -211 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 597.810(1)(b) (Michie
1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1449 (West 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28 (1956); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-1 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-40
(Michie 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 63.50.040-.040.070 (West 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.50 (West 1977)).
234. Faber, supra note 132, at 28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46
cmt. d (1995) (stating "[t]he identity of even an unknown person may possess commercial
value"). See also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 978 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating
differences in levels of celebrity concern damages, not liability, in right of publicity actions);
Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.2d 254, 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) ("[A]ll
persons, of whatever station in life, from the relatively unknown to the world famous, are to be
secured against rapacious commercial exploitation."); DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 10, at 547
("[I]n at least 15 of these states, legislation exists that governs this area either partially or
completely."). But see Alicia M. Hunt, Comment, Everyone Wants to be a Star: Extensive
Publicity Rights for Noncelebrities Unduly Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1605
(2001) (arguing against efforts to federalize the right of publicity by statutes and suggesting that
this right should not be extended to those who possess identities without some demonstrable
commercial values associated with them).
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technology. Right of publicity statutes include provisions to protect existing
celebrity footage from being modified to create a different image because
"[a]dvertisers can now create the impression that John Wayne actually drank
Coors beer, that Fred Astaire developed his dancing technique with a Dirt
Devil, that Lucille Ball shopped at Service Merchandise, and that Ed Sullivan
spoke glowingly of the M-Class Mercedes. 235
B. Indiana Statutory Guidance
Under the Indiana Publicity Statute, the right of publicity refers to the
property interests inherent in a personality's name, voice, signature,
photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures, or mannerisms.236
Indiana has taken the approach that the right of publicity is a right that
stems from property and estate law. The proprietary nature of the right is
evidenced by section sixteen of the Indiana statute, recognizing that the rights
of publicity are "property rights, freely transferable and descendible, in whole
or in part." 237 "A person may not use an aspect of a personality's right of
publicity for commercial purpose during the personality's lifetime or for one
hundred (100) years after the date of the personality's death .... ,-238 The
Indiana statute has been the model for many other states and has led to the steps
taken by California in 1998.239 Indiana's statute also sets out exceptions which
tackle First Amendment issues with the right of publicity-specifically, the
scope of its application. Accordingly, the provision is not applicable to books,
films, news reporting purposes, and single and original works of art.24° In
addition to these exceptions, a newspaper publisher is not liable for publishing
an advertisement by a third party containing an infringement of another's rights
of publicity.24'
C. The California Privacy Protection Act of 1998
In 1998, California passed the nation's most far-reaching legislation
designed to improve privacy protections. This law came in the wake of Princess
Diana's tragic death and at the behest of the Screen Actprs Guild.242 The statute
provides that
235. Faber, supra note 132, at 30.
236. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-7 (LexisNexis 2002).
237. Faber, supra note 132, at 28.
238. § 32-36-1-8.
239. Faber, supra note 132, at 29.
240. § 32-36-1-1.
241. Faber, supra note 132, at 29.
242. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing the Rights of Privacy and the Press: A Reply to
Professor Smolla, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1152, 1153; Smolla, supra note 2, at 1107.
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[a] person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the
defendant knowingly enters onto the land of another without
permission or otherwise committed a trespass, in order to
physically invade the privacy of the plaintiff with the intent
to capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other
physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or
familial activity and the physical invasion occurs in a manner
that is offensive to a reasonable person. 43
The statute "departs from the common law method of protecting privacy
directly by defining it"2" in terms of Prosser's four privacy torts. Rather, the
statute protects privacy indirectly by improving the protections provided by
non-legal forms of regulation.245 The statute attempts
to resurrect the privacy protection traditionally furnished by
physical barriers by 'redefining' what is meant by physical
space: the statute defines a person's private 'space' not in
terms of feet or yards, but instead in terms of what can be
observed without the assistance of sensory-enhancing
technology.246
Thus, the statute imposes liability under a theory of "constructive invasion
of privacy" and prohibits "intrusions through the use of technical means that
facilitate privacy invasions that otherwise could not be obtained without a
trespass." 47 Constructive invasion ofprivacy protects "personal" and "familial"
activities.2"s These activities include those involving intimate details of the
plaintiff's personal life, the plaintiff's family, and other private matters.249
243. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1708.8(a) (West Supp. 2002).
244. Note, Privacy, Technology, and the California "Anti-Paparazzi " Statute, 112 HARV.
L. REv. 1367, 1377 (1999). See also supra note 30 for the current British position on this issue.
245. Note, supra note 244, at 1378.
246. Id.
247. Smolla, supra note 2, at 1107 (citing § 1708.8(b)). Section 1708.8(b) states:
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defendant
attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person,
any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of
the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances
in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the
use of a visual or auditory enhancing device, regardless of whether there
is a physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical
impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the
visual or auditory enhancing device was used.
248. § 1708.8(b).
249. § 1708.8(k). Section 1708.8(k) states:
For purposes of this section, "personal and familial activity" includes, but
is not limited to, intimate details of the plaintiff's personal life, interactions
with the plaintiff's family or significant others, or other aspects of the
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The statute provides for treble damages as well as punitive damages.2 50
Furthermore, the plaintiff is entitled to the disgorgement of the defendant's
profit if the invasion of privacy was committed for a commercial purpose. 25'
However, the California legislature included the "caveat that mere publication
of material obtained in violation of the law does not itself qualify as a violation,
although such a publication might be independently tortious as the publication
of private facts.
2 52
Since California enacted this law, many scholars have debated the
constitutional limitations that may potentially impact this statute-specifically
with respect to the potential balancing of the individual's privacy interest
against the First Amendment freedom of the press. 3
Most of the debate surrounds the constitutionality of the California
publicity law that regulates an individual's privacy interest. Some assert that it
is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment under two theories:
it singles out one class of persons and the law is content-based, not content-
neutral. 2 4 Thus, the law arguably violates "current First Amendment principles
that prohibit singling out a certain class of speakers or a certain form of media
for specially disfavorable treatment. ' '2 5 A law that is "on the cusp between a
content-based and content-neutral law, pose[s] the kind of difficult problem of
characterization that faced the Supreme Court in City ofLadue v. Gilleo.''256 "In
plaintiffs private affairs or concerns. Personal and familial activity does
not include illegal or otherwise criminal activity as delineated in
subdivision (f). However, "personal and familial activity" shall include the
activities of victims of crime in circumstances where either subdivision (a)
or (b) or both, would apply.
250. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(c) (West Supp. 2002). The statute provides:
A person who commits physical invasion of privacy or constructive
invasion of privacy, or both, is liable for up to three times the amount of
any general and special damages that are proximately caused by the
violation of this section. This person may also be liable for punitive
damages, subject to proof according to Section 3294. If the plaintiff proves
that the invasion of privacy was committed for a commercial purpose, the
defendant shall also be subject to disgorgement to the plaintiff of any
proceeds or other consideration obtained as a result of the violation of this
section.
Id.
251. Id. "Commercial purpose" is defined in section 1708.80) to mean "any act done with
the expectation of a sale, financial gain, or other consideration."
252. Smolla, supra note 2, at 1108 (citing § 1708.8(e)). Section 1708.8(e) states:
Sale, transmission, publication, broadcast, or use of any image or recording
of the type, or under the circumstances, described in this section shall not
itself constitute a violation of this section, nor shall this section be
construed to limit all other right or remedies of plaintiff in law or equity,
including, but not limited to, the publication of private facts.
253. See Chemerinsky, supra note 242, at 1153-58; Smolla, supra note 2, at 1106-16;
supra notes 114-30 and accompanying text.
254. Smolla, supra note 2, at 1114.
255. Id. at 11 I0 (citations omitted).
256. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
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Ladue the Court in effect finally said that whether the law was content-based
or content-neutral did not matter, the impact on expressive interests was too
severe to be sustained." '257 Moreover, content-based laws are presumptively
unconstitutional. 58 The Califomia law is content-based because it contains "as
a predicate element the perpetrator's intent to sell or transfer communicative
material.1
259
Others disagree and maintain the statute is applied equally to all who
engage in particular, specifically-defined behavior-those who "obtain[]
through technological enhancement equipment images" or sound "of personal
or family activity, where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and where
the images could not otherwise have been obtained except by a physical
trespass. 26 Because application of the law is done in an equal manner, it does
not rise to a violation of First Amendment rights.26'
D. The Fourth Amendment Analogy
The California statute creates boundaries analogous to Fourth Amendment
search and seizure boundaries. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to
undertake a complete analysis of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it suffices
to acknowledge that California's legislative approach hinges on the point in
time where the acquisition of information becomes a trespass.262 If one obtained
the photograph or personal information without trespassing, there would be no
privacy violation.263 Ironically, this approach mirrors that ofthe Supreme Court
in its early cases dealing with the Fourth Amendment. In United States v.
Knotts2 64 the police used a radio transmitter to track the movement of a suspect
along public streets.261 "[T]he Court held that the police could observe
movements in public without any Fourth Amendmentjustification, because any
member of the public might have observed the same thing. 2 66 This concept is
known as the "plain view" doctrine.
In contrast, in United States v. Karo2 67 the Court held that a tracking device
used by the police to monitor the movement of several drums of illegal
257. Smolla, supra note 2, at 1107 n.38.
258. Id. at 1113 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 115 (1991), for the proposition that, "[a] statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First
Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech."
(citations omitted)).
259. Smolla, supra note 2, at 1113.
260. See Chemerinsky, supra note 242, at 1156.
261. Id.
262. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West Supp. 2002).
263. Id.
264. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
265. Id. at 277.
266. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1265, 1268 (1999) (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-85).
267. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
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chemicals within a house was a Fourth Amendment violation absent
compliance with search and seizure rules.26 The Court reasoned that, because
ordinary citizens could not observe the movements within the house, then
neither could the police. 69
These two cases are paradigms of numerous cases creating a demarcation
between what a normal citizen can view without special permission and what
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.27 ° "All these results seem
designed to take the privacy people have and use it to define the privacy that
the police cannot invade without good cause."27 ' This concept is analogous to
the right to privacy associated with this statute.272 The California legislature
placed the line of privacy at trespass, whether physically or with the use of
technology. This is the same parameter used by the courts in most Fourth
Amendment cases. Drawing on the rights created by the Fourth Amendment
which hold the government to certain standards, a strong case is made for
placing the same limit on the intrusion of privacy by the media and other
individuals. "The things and places people keep secret from one another are
surely more private, and hence their discovery more harmful to privacy, than
the things and places people expose to the world."273 Just as the police are able
to observe actions that are open and visible to the public without justification,
a member of the press can observe these actions without invading a celebrity's
privacy interest.
E. Another Theory-Commercial Speech and the Test
A second theory that many suggest is the appropriate measure of the right
of publicity is to classify it as commercial speech and apply the Central
Hudson test.274 The Central Hudson four-part test for the regulation of
commercial speech is as follows:
(1) [T]he speech in question must be lawful and not
misleading, and (2) the asserted government interest must be
substantial; if these first two elements are satisfied, then in
268. Id. at 713-18.
269. Id. at 716.
270. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (viewing the same yard from an airplane
is not a search); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (same); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.2(a), at 402-03 (3d ed. 1996) (noting
that overhearing a conversation on the streets is not a search); id. § 2.3(D, at 504-10 (finding
jumping over a backyard fence to look around is a search). However, "[t]he law on this subject
is complicated, but in general, trespassory entries into either homes or yards constitute a search;
the chief exception is entry into areas where a visitor-for example, someone delivering a
package-might naturally venture." Stuntz, supra note 266, at 1269.
271. Stuntz, supra note 266, at 1269.
272. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West Supp. 2002).
273. Stuntz, supra note 266, at 1270.
274. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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order for the regulation to be upheld, (3) the regulation must
directly advance the asserted governmental interest, and (4)
the regulation must not be more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest.275
Others subscribe to the view that a compelling state interest justifies a state and
possibly the federal government to step in and protect every individual's right
to privacy or publicity. 6 If the government is not allowed to intrude into one's
privacy, then does not the government have a compelling interest in preventing
others from invading that same privacy?277
It has been surmised that the Ninth Circuit in White ignored First
Amendment protection by not applying the Central Hudson test for commercial
speech.7  If publicity is advertising and, thus, is commercial speech, the
Central Hudson doctrine seems to be appropriate.279
Ultimately, the issue is whether a right of publicity claim could be viewed
as advancing directly a substantial state interest.28 ° The argument is, "If one
defines the right of publicity as an individual property right ultimately
grounded in personal autonomy, one can argue that it is worthy of advancement
as a 'substantial state interest'; the state is expected to protect personal self-
determination and to enforce property rights."28 '
F. Human Autonomy Interest as a Property Right
These two concepts, the Fourth Amendment analogy and the application
of the Central Hudson test, stem from the premise that "[t]he right of publicity
can also be viewed as a property right grounded in human autonomy." '282 As
postulated, "it belongs to all-including celebrities-who commodify their
images-and it embraces noneconomic objections to the commercial
exploitation of identity." '283 It rests on the theory that the individual is an
autonomous being that preceded the creation of property.284
275. Haemmerli, supra note 45, at 458 n.306.
276. See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 45, at 477-87 (suggesting federal legislation of the
right of publicity).
277. Id.
278. Stephen R. Barnett, The Right of Publicity Versus Free Speech in Advertising: Some
Counter-Points to Professor McCarthy, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 593, 600 (1996).
279. Id.; Haemrnmerli, supra note 45, at 457-58.
280. Haemmerli, supra note 45, at 458.
281. Id. Contra Theodore F. Haas, Storehouse of Starlight: The First Amendment Privilege
to Use Names andLikenesses in CommercialAdvertising, 19 U.C. DAVIsL. REv. 539,572 (1986)
("[A]n advertiser should be able to use a person's names or likeness without consent as part of
a truthful statement about a legitimate product.").
282. Haemmerli, supra note 45, at 385.
283. Id. at 385-86.
284. Id. at 413.
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"Viewing the right of publicity as an extension of human worth and
autonomy, rather than a purely economic interest, also changes the nature of the
exercise and balances the right against competing societal claims. 2 5
Proponents of this theory argue that the Zacchini Court 286 took the wrong
approach when it focused on the individual's act.287 Indeed, it has been argued
that the "appropriate focus of the right of publicity is the human being, the
person-not her work product." 28 Thus, by focusing on an economic-incentive
approach, one creates a narrow right that is "exclusively pecuniary. 289
Haemmerli makes the point that "positive law recognizes the possibility of
a publicity right with both personal and economic attributes., 291 "Autonomy
implies the individual's right to control the use of her own person, since
interference with one's person is a direct infringement of the innate right of
freedom." 291
[This] philosophical orientation permits us to reconceive the
right of publicity as a freedom-based property right with both
moral and economic characteristics, rather than being forced
to make a dichotomous choice between a privacy right
concemed with moral injury on the one hand, or a purely
pecuniary publicity right on the other.292
It is the "notion of individual control and self-determination" 293 which forms
a property right. "[A] property right which provides for control over
objectification of identity is not logically opposed to an autonomy right that
protects the self; and the two can, in fact, be viewed as two facets of
freedom., 294 "Identity remains something intrinsic to the individual, subject to
individual control as an autonomy-based property right, no matter what or who
has affected its level of fame., 295 The autonomous person theory posits that
even if the public has played a role in creating a celebrity, the celebrity is
entitled to his own identity.296
285. Id. at 403.
286. See discussion supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
287. Haemmerli, supra note 45, at 401.
288. Id. at 402-03.
289. Id. at 403.
290. Id. at 405.
291. Id. at416.
292. Id. at 422.
293. Haemmerli, supra note 45, at 416.
294. Id. at 427.
295. Id. at 431.
296. Id.
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X. COMMON JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: OVERLOOKED OR
OVEREMPHASIZED
One commentator has observed that the sentiment embodied in the so-
called right of publicity is best expressed in a recent series of television
commercials featuring tennis great Andre Agassi. 97 In a commercial for Canon
cameras, Agassi asserts that "image is everything. 298 One's image is the coin
of the realm in the world of high stakes celebrity endorsements.
A. Celebrity: The Fruits of Whose Labor?
Typically, three justifications for the right of publicity have been
advanced.299 First, it has been posited that everyone has a "property right in her
own person" and therefore in "the labor of her body."3 ° As a consequence, it
is argued that individuals who have "long and laboriously nurtured the fruit of
publicity values" should be the sole arbiter of how the commercial value of
their image is exploited, if at all.3"' In so much as a persona is a creation of the
celebrity, the individual should have control over it. In the event that the image
of the celebrity is appropriated for the benefit of someone else, the celebrity
should be compensated for the harm done.302 As Vince Lombardi, Jr. has said:
"Nothing anyone can do is going to enhance my father's reputation, but they
certainly can detract from it."3
°3
Others hold to the view that "however 'scrupulously' [a star] may try to
monitor and shape [his image], the media and the public always play a
substantial part in the imaging-making process."30 4 Reality suggests that an
individual's celebrity is not a product of his own making.30 5 Notwithstanding
the energies exerted by an entertainer to achieve some measure of renown,
celebrity status, to a large extent, is a function of societal trends.306 Only with
the blessing of the public will the performer achieve the level of fame that he
so desires. The very fact that Tom Waits, Bette Midler, or Vanna White is a
celebrity has a great deal to do with the way each has been received by the
297. Todd J. Rahimi, The Power to Control Identity: Limiting a Celebrity's Right to
Publicity, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 725 (1995). The commercial ran from Spring 1992 until
Spring 1994. Id. at 725 n.1.
298. Id.
299. Sen, supra note 212, at 739 (citing Nimmer, supra note 134, at 215-16; Gordon, supra
note 211, at 1540-50; Madow, supra note 10, at 178-238).
300. Sen, supra note 212, at 739-40 (citing JoHNLoCKE, THE SECONDTREATISEOF GOVERNMENT
16-30 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merril Co., 1952) (1690)).
301. Id. at 740 (quoting Nimmer, supra note 134, at 216).
302. Id. at 740.
303. Faber, supra note 132, at 28 (quoting Mark Hyman, Dead Men Don 't Screw Up Ad
Campaigns, Bus. WK., Mar. 10, 1997, at 115).
304. Madow, supra note 10, at 193.
305. Rahimi, supra note 297, at 731 (citing Madow, supra note 10, at 181-82).
306. Id. at 732.
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public. Occasionally, a celebrity becomes well-known as the result of dumb
luck, serendipitous happenstance, or even criminal conduct." 7 Consider, for
example, the oft-repeated Hollywood legend of the actor who was discovered
by a talent scout in a dime store, only to be catapulted instantly into super
stardom. Certainly, it could be argued that this person has done little if anything
to cultivate his celebrity image. Many unknown entertainers expend far more
energy than the so-called celebrities and are far more talented and yet never
receive the sort of protection afforded the accidental celebrity.308 Perhaps,
because celebrity status depends upon a number of variables, some access to
it should belong to the public.3"9 It has been contended, "Any rights created
through this process should thus belong to the public, at least in proportion to
their contribution, and a complete privatization of these rights is actually an
infringement upon the public's moral rights."
310
Further, still others hold to the idea that "the public, or segments of the
public, create and derive meaning from celebrity images."31' Therefore, the
public "must have free rein in manipulating or 'recording' those images in
order to remain culturally viable." 3 2 Technological advances allow the public
to recode or reconstruct texts and images and thereby create something new.
31 3
Thus, the argument continues over the extent of the public's right to know and
maintain pop culture through free expression and the degree of individual
celebrity control over his own photo and identity.
B. Protecting or Stifling Creativity?
One scholar suggests that guarding the celebrity's economic interest in his
image will foster creativity.31 4 "[T]he advertiser who[] unauthorizedly
appropriates a persona that the celebrity has constructed 'reaps where another
has sown' by getting something for nothing."3 5 From this it is urged that
without the necessary protection, a celebrity will be disinclined to do any work
of lasting value for fear that the fruits of his labor will be squandered and
exploited by one with little or no sweat-equity in the project being exploited.
The resulting harm is also a loss to society, which is deprived of the
performer's talents.316
307. Weiler, supra note 160, at 241.
308. Clay, supra note 214, at 502.
309. Id. at 502.
310. Id.
311. Haemmerli, supra note 45, at 431.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 432.
314. Sen, supra note 212, at 740 (citations omitted).
315. Weiler, supra note 160, at 242 (citations omitted).
316. Rahimi, supra note 297, at 747.
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Contrariwise, this argument ignores that most every celebrity, to one extent
or another, borrows from those who went before him.3 17 Indeed, an overly
restrictive interpretation of the right of publicity would not foster creativity;
rather, it would stifle it because in most appropriation cases the offending
conduct reveals some measure of creativity.31 This is not to argue that blatant
appropriations devoid of any level of originality should not be protected
against."' The touchstone of analysis under this justification would call for a
determination of how much the defendant has contributed to a new creation and
how much the entertainer has appropriated from a previous creation of the
plaintiff.32 From this it could be argued that Vanna White has benefitted from
all the TV game show hostesses that went before her.32" ' Perhaps she is no more
than a "rip-off' of "Barker's Beauties" on The Price is Right. More accurately,
it should be concluded that, while White has built on the roles played by
numerous others, there is something distinct about her role.322
To the extent that advertisers would be able to borrow from those who
went before and evoke their image (without suggesting endorsement), the
publicity rights of the celebrity should not be significantly impaired 32 1 "[T]he
celebrity himself could still command substantial endorsement power," as it is
the value of a publicity right that is maximized by the celebrity's actual
participation.324
C. An Element of Deception: The Forgotten Value of the Right of
Publicity
Lastly, the protection of the right of publicity is justified on the grounds
that a "celebrity should have exclusive control of her right of publicity in order
to protect consumers from possible misrepresentation, deception, and false
advertising. 3 25 To the extent that the association with a celebrity tells the
public anything about whatever is being advertised, this final justification is
designed to prohibit advertisements which would mislead the public into
believing that there has been an endorsement. In fact, it has been noted that
"[t]he right of publicity was initially developed to provide redress for 'an
317. Id. at 733 (citing Madow, supra note 10, at 196-97).
318. Id. (citing Madow, supra note 10, at 204).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 744.
322. Rahmi, supra note 297, at 744-45.
323. Clay, supra note 214, at 505.
324. Id.
325. Sen, supra noted 212, at 741.
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unauthorized use of a person's name or picture in advertising that suggested the
individual's endorsement of a product." 326
The other side of this justification, is that by creating the impression that the
celebrity has endorsed the product, the misappropriator has impaired the ability
of that celebrity to secure endorsement contracts with similar products.32 7
Therefore, affording a celebrity the right of publicity protects the value of the
celebrity's identity and stems any unwanted association with a particular
product line.328
After White it appears that the standard of liability in right of publicity
claims is mere identifiability.329 There does not seem to be a required showing
of likelihood of confusion.33 ° As with the Lombardo and White cases, the
viewer of the commercial most assuredly would have known that he was not
watching Vanna White or Guy Lombardo. Unfortunately, lack of confusion
will not tip the scales in favor of a defendant in a situation similar to the White
and Lombardo cases."' Where, in a right of publicity action, the questioned
conduct gives the impression of false endorsement, the aggrieved party may
seek relief under the Lanham Act.332 It is urged that the common law right of
publicity, with which this Article is concerned, incorporate a determination of
whether the offending conduct is likely to mislead the consumer.
It is this final factor which likely could have been determinative in each of
the cases that led up to the White decision. All of the appropriations of which
plaintiffs complained utilized "identifying characteristics unique to the
plaintiffs . . . which[] were the only information as to the identity of the
individual." '333 In Midler, Waits, and Lahr it was the plaintiffs' voices that
identified them.334 However, in Motschenbacher,335 it was the plaintiff's race
car that was unmistakably associated with the plaintiff and therefore
"compelled the inference that Motschenbacher was the person sitting in the
racing car." '336 "[T]he advertisement affirmatively represented that the person
326. Id. at 742 (quoting Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights,
Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365, 366-67
(1992)).
327. Weiler, supra note 160, at 244.
328. Sen, supra noted 212, at 752 (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY
AND PRIVACY § 1.11 (C) (1995)).
329. Weiler, supra note 160, at 244 (citations omitted).
330. Id. (citations omitted).
331. Id. at 244-45 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989); Nimmer,
supra note 134, at 212). Nimmer writes: "Publicity values of a person or firm may be profitably
appropriated and exploited without the necessity of any imputation that such person or firm is
connected with the exploitation undertaken by the appropriator." Nimmer, supra note 134, at
212.
332. Weiler, supra note 160, at 245 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988)).
333. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1404 (9th Cir. 1992) (Alarcon,
J., dissenting).
334. See supra notes 153-57, 172-88 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
336. White, 971 F.2d at 1403.
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depicted therein was the plaintiff."3"7 The public could reasonably arrive at the
result the celebrity had endorsed the product.338 Arguably, no such deception
was indulged in the White case. It is clear in White that the robot was not Vanna
White. There was enough information in the Vanna White commercial to
inform the audience that the advertisement was not meant to suggest an
endorsement.
The dissent in White argued energetically that the identifying
characteristics of the robot are not unique to Vanna White.339 It is urged that the
evening gown, the blond hair, and jewelry are very commonplace in today's
society and, moreover, are only attributes of the role that Vanna White plays."
Furthermore, the game-show board behind the robot is an attribute that belongs
to the producers of Wheel of Fortune, not Vanna White.4 Perhaps the dissent
placed too much emphasis on these facts in arriving at its conclusion. If the
defendant in White had hired a look-alike who wore a blond wig, an evening
gown, and jewelry, who posed in front of a Wheel of Fortune board, it would
be difficult to suggest that no appropriation of the plaintiffs identity had
occurred.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
It is imperative that an individual be able to protect the economic interest
built up in his name. The wrongful appropriator ensures that the aggrieved
celebrity cannot guarantee protection from infringement to a prospective
licensee. "[P]urchasers of the right to use his [image] will not be inclined to pay
as high a price for this right as they might have" if an exclusive guarantee were
made.342 Moreover, the celebrity himself is denied the economic benefit of the
commercial value of his identity. There is also the risk of misleading the public
into thinking that the celebrity whose persona has been appropriated approves
of the product. As a result, the public may be deceived into buying a product
of inferior quality. The celebrity in turn would have to bear the stigma of
association with the inferior product. Effective protection of the right of
publicity demands balancing it against whatever value society may derive from
the so-called 'appropriations' negated under the White standard. What is called
for is a test that properly evaluates the pertinent First Amendment concerns
involved in right of publicity cases, and affords necessary protection against
consumer deception and unauthorized association of the celebrity with the
items being advertised.
337. Id.
338. Rahimi, supra note 297, at 740-41.
339. White, 971 F. 2d at 1404.
340. Id. at 1404-05.
341. Id. at 1405.
342. Elbaum, supra note 23, at 370 n.66.
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A. Reaffirming the Right of Publicity as Protection Against False
Endorsements.
In determining whether an appropriation has occurred, it will always be
necessary to answer what, for the White court, is the ultimate issue-was the
identity evoked?3 43 But the inquiry must not end there, as the right of publicity
affords protection primarily in those situations where there is a likelihood that
the public will be deceived into thinking that there has been an endorsement.
It has been suggested that judicial inquiry be limited to: (1) commercial uses
of the celebrity's name, likeness, or identifying attributes whose only purpose
is to trade on the name of the celebrity, such as t-shirts, posters, and the like;
(2) commercial uses that imply a celebrity endorsement; and (3) commercial
"uses that rely on the 'associative' value of a celebrity-that is, uses that
transfer the feelings engendered in the public mind by the celebrity to the
advertised product or service." 3" In analyzing the right of publicity within these
limited scenarios, perhaps the court should determine: (1) whether the
identifying characteristic belongs to the plaintiff, and (2) whether the public is
"under the impression that the plaintiffhas personally endorsed the product."345
For instance, in White the identifying characteristics did not belong to Vanna
White; rather, the game board belonged to Wheel of Fortune.
B. More Emphatic Invocation of Free Speech Protection
One commentator has noted that for a court to find any commercial speech
in right of publicity cases is to virtually assure a failed First Amendment
defense.34 6 And, as it is unlikely that any of the right of publicity cases will
involve anything other than commercial speech, the lack of First Amendment
protection is almost inevitable.347 In order to properly safeguard the commercial
value of one's identity, while at the same time maximizing the enrichment of
our cultural experience, a more suitable framework must be devised in right of
publicity cases.
One possible analytical framework would involve distinguishing between
uses of celebrity identity that foster public debate, thus embodying the First
Amendment values, and uses that sell a product.3 48 "[I] f it serves an informative
or cultural function, it will be immune from liability; if it serves no function but
343. Weiler, supra note 160, at 269.
344. Id. at 270 (citations omitted).
345. Rahimi, supra note 297, at 750.
346. Patricia B. Frank, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.: The Right of
Publicity Spins Its Wheels, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115, 1136 (1994).
347. Id. at 1136.
348. Weiler, supra note 160, at 262 (citing Peter Felcher & Edward Rubin, Privacy,
Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1596-97 (1979)).
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merely exploits the individual portrayed, immunity will not be granted." '49
Estate of Presley v. Russens5 ° illustrates this framework.3"'
Presley involved an impersonator whose "shtick" was to re-create a live
Elvis Presley show.35 2 The Presley estate sued the impersonator for
appropriating Presley's identity."' 3 The court, in discussing what, if any, First
Amendment protection should be afforded the impersonator, asked whether the
primary purpose of the portrayal was for cultural enrichment or for cultural
exploitation.3"4 The court concluded that while there was an element of cultural
enrichment, the performance lacked any creative component and was therefore
commercially exploitative. 5 While disagreeing with the court's determination
in this case, scholars have maintained that the decision is valuable because it
used the proper analytical approach.35 6 Applying the Russen analysis to the
White case, one commentator observed that, generally speaking, Samsung
evoked the identity of Vanna White for the purpose of selling its product.3 7
However, Samsung did not do so by suggesting gratuitously that Vanna White
endorsed the product. Rather, it provided insight into the technological
direction in which contemporary society is headed-that one day every task,
even those of a game show host, will be performed by machines.35
C. Idea v. Expression
Alternatively, it has been suggested that right of publicity cases would
benefit from an idea-expression analysis, which would demand only that the
expression of a particular celebrity role be protected, while the appropriation
of a particular class of roles (i.e., the idea behind the expression) would be
privileged.35 9 As applied to the White case, this idea/expression dichotomy
would not give Vanna White a commercial monopoly over future portrayals of
game-show hostesses, but would protect anything unique about her own
portrayal of the role.36 It does not appear that there was anything terribly
unique about Vanna White's game-show character-evening gown, blond hair,
and jewelry-thus she would not be afforded protection.
349. Id. at 262. (quoting Felcher & Rubin, supra note 348, at 1596).
350. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
351. Weiler, supra note 160, at 262-63.
352. 513 F. Supp. at 1348.
353. Id. at 1344.
354. Id. at 1359.
355. Id. at 1359-61.
356. Weiler, supra note 160, at 263 n.310 (citing Samuelson, supra note 145, at 873 ("To
avid Elvis fans-and there are millions of them-no greater cultural achievement would be
possible" than "a live 'Elvis' performance that could no longer be supplied by the originator of
the style because of his death.")).
357. Id. at 263.
358. Id.
359. Frank, supra note 346, at 1138.
360. Id. at 1138-39.
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Valuable social commentary like parody and satire deserve protection. The
purpose of the First Amendment is broader than just religion and politics.3 61 Its
purpose is to protect the forces that influence our culture and our society.362
"The last thing that we need is ... a law that lets public figures keep people
from mocking them or evoking their images in the mind of the public. 363
D. The Right of Performance
It has been suggested that a "right of performance" replaces the right of
publicity.3" This new right affords protection from conduct which attempts to
"fulfill the demand for the celebrity's performance value. 3 65 Such a test would
cover both the unauthorized look-alike or sound-alike in commercials, and the
appropriation of a celebrity's videotaped performance.366 Imitations of style and
evocations of identity would not be sufficient to afford protection. Vanna White
would not have a cause of action under this formula because the commercial
was not a performance opportunity for her.3 67 In fact, it is likely that the
statement of the commercial-that Samsung products would be around when
a robot replaced Vanna White-would have been ruined had White performed.
Viewed from another perspective, if Bette Midler or Tom Waits had appeared
in the advertisements about which each brought suit, the commercial would not
have lost its message. If anything, the commercials would have connected to
that small segment of sophisticated listeners who would otherwise be able to
detect an imitation.
The right to privacy is one that every American inherently believes he
holds unto himself.3 68 In actuality, it is a right composed of two strains:
informational and intrusional.3 69 Accordingly, one has an interest in certain
facts (e.g., personal or intimate) about himself which, "for the most part,
[can]not be freely disseminated to others without our knowledge or
361. Weiler, supra note 160, at 266 (quoting White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d
1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of rehearing)).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Clay, supra note 214, at 514.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 516. But see Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law
Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights ofAuthors, 23 GA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1988) (comparing
the right of personality doctrine with moral rights concept as a way to expand the legal rights of
creators over creations); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational
Interests of Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First
Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 151 (2001) (arguing the personal interests sought to be protected
by publicity rights law would be better effected by the moral rights provisions of the copyright
laws-for moral rights are understood conventionally as protecting a creator's personal
interests).
368. For an interesting comparative view of this issue, see Fred H. Cate, The Changing
Face of Privacy Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REv. 173
(1999).
369. JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY 140 (1994).
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permission." 7' When information of this nature is made public, privacy is
invaded. Similarly, privacy encompasses an interest in restricting certain
physical areas of space to other people. Taken as a unit, then, the right of
privacy "provides prima facie support for the institution of private property."37
By controlling access to information and space, the elements of ownership
(e.g., exclusive use and control of possessory rights) are both established and
validated through recognition of the rights of privacy and publicity.372
Whether one considers the privacy right from the viewpoint of a publicity
interest based on economics or one in which each individual is autonomous, the
California, Indiana and the Ninth Circuit approaches draw a line of
demarcation that balances wisely both interests. However, when individuals
step into the world of celebrity and hold themselves out to the public, they have
made a conscious choice to diminish their own right to privacy. Two
conceptions of fame exist. Fame is a choice between the market-oriented,
individualistic version of publicity and the communitarian version that
encompasses society's role in creating the fame. The only way to balance these
diametric views is through a right to publicity, which incorporates a defined
property interest.
373
370. Id. See generally JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF
PRIVACY IN AMERICA 222-23 (2000) (arguing the need for private space in order to assure
protection and avoid "being judged out of context in a world of fleeting attention spans"). See
also Daniel J. Soloce, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1091-92, 1154 (2002)
(stating efforts to locate a common denominator for privacy-especially in the age ofcyberspace
where relationships are more businesslike in nature than intimate and interpersonal-have not
met with success and that what is needed today is to have challenges to privacy analyzed and
tested from "bottom up" within a "common pool of similar elements").
371. CHRISTMAN, supra note 369, at 140.
372. Id.
373. For an analysis of the subtleties in determining a "reasonable" judicial decision based
upon anyone of three modes of balancing-fact, rule, and result-see George P. Smith, II,
Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical Revisionist Theory of Contemporary
Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 716-20 (1995). See also Richard A. Posner, The
Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 891 (1988) (noting that the goal of the judge
is a reasonable decision).
The right of publicity is a true property right. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp.
1339, 1354 (D.N.J. 1981). It is transferable, through license or assignment, and is descendible.
Id. at 1354-55. See also Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage
Prods., Inc. 296 S.E.2d 697, 704-05 (Ga. 1982) (recognizing that the right of publicity is
assignable, inheritable and devisable).
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